

# Modes of Operation

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<http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse567-06/>



1. Modes of Operation: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR
2. Privacy+Integrity
3. DES Attacks
4. 3DES and its design


Ref: Chapter 4 of textbook.

# Modes of Operation

1. Electronic Code Book (ECB)
2. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
3. Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
4. Output Feedback Mode (OFB)
5. Counter Mode (CTR)

# 1. Electronic Code Book (ECB)


- ❑ Each block is independently encoded



- ❑ Problem:
  - Identical Input  $\Rightarrow$  Identical Output
  - Can insert encoded blocks


# Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- Add a random number before encoding



# CBC (Cont)

- Use  $C_i$  as random number for  $i+1$




- Need Initial Value (IV)
- If no IV, then one can guess changed blocks
- Example: Continue Holding, Start Bombing

## CBC (Cont)

- ❑ Attack 1: Change selected bits in encrypted message
  - Garbled text not detected by computers
- ❑ Attack 2: Attacker knows plain text and cipher text. Can change plain text.
  - 32-bit CRC may not detect. 64-bit CRC may be better.

# k-Bit Output Feedback Mode (OFB)

- ❑ IV is used to generate a stream of blocks
- ❑ Stream is used as a one-time pad and XOR'ed to plain text






## OFB (Cont)

- ❑ Advantages:
  - Stream can be generated in advance
  - 1-bit error in transmission affects only one bit of plain text
  - Message can be any size
  - All messages are immediately transmitted
- ❑ Disadvantage: Plain text can be trivially modified
- ❑ Only left-most  $k$ -bits of the block can be used

# k-Bit Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)

- ❑ Key Stream blocks use previous block as IV
- ❑ k-bits of encoded streams are used to generate next block




## CFB (Cont)

- ❑ Stream cannot be generated in advance.
- ❑ In practice,  $k=8$  bit or 64 bit
- ❑ If a byte is added or deleted, that byte and next 8 bytes will be affected
- ❑ No block rearranging effect

# Counter Mode (CTR)


- ❑ If the same IV and key is used again,
  - Xor of two encrypted messages = Xor of plain text
- ❑ IV is incremented and used to generate one-time pad



- ❑ Advantage: Pre-computed

# Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- ❑ Cryptographic checksum or Message Integrity Code (MIC)
- ❑ CBC residue is sent with plain text




# Weak and Semi-Weak Keys

- ❑ Recall that 56-bit DES key is divided in two halves and permuted to produce C0 and D0
- ❑ Keys are weak if C0 and D0 (after permutation) result in:
  - All 0's
  - All 1's
  - Alternating 10 or 01
- ❑ Four possibilities for each half  $\Rightarrow$  16 weak keys

# Privacy + Integrity

❑ Can't send encrypted message and CBC residue.

1. Use strong CRC
2. Use CBC residue with another key.



- The 2nd CBC can be weak, as in Kerberos.
- Kerberos uses  $K+F0F0\dots F0F0$  as the 2nd key.

## Privacy + Integrity (Cont)

3. Use hash with another key. Faster than encryption.
4. Use Offset Code Book (OCB),  
<http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/draft-krovetz-ocb-00.txt>



# MISTY1

- ❑ Block cipher with 128 bit keys
- ❑ With 4 to 8 rounds. Each round consists of 3 sub-rounds.
- ❑ Secure against linear and differential cryptanalysis
- ❑ Named after the inventors: Matsui Mitsuru, Ichikawa Tetsuya, Sorimachi Toru, Tokita Toshio, and Yamagishi Atsuhiko
- ❑ A.k.a. Mitsubishi Improved Security Technology
- ❑ Recommended for Japanese government use. Patented
- ❑ Described in RFC 2994
- ❑ Ref: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MISTY1>

# KASUMI

- ❑ Selected by 3GPP
- ❑ 64-bit block cipher with 128 bit key
- ❑ A variant of MISTY1
- ❑ Needs limited computing power
- ❑ Works in real time (voice)
- ❑ KASUMI with counter mode and output feedback modes. This algorithm is known as f8.

# GSM Encryption

- ❑ Three stream ciphers: A5/1, A5/2, A5/3
- ❑ Description of A5/1 and A5/2 were never released to public but were reverse engineered and broken
- ❑ A5/3 is based KASUMI


# DES Attacks

- ❑ 1997 RSA Lab set a prize of \$10k
- ❑ Curtin and Dolske used combined power of Internet computers to find the key using a brute force method.
- ❑ 1998 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) showed that a \$250k machine could find any DES key in max 1 week. Avg 3 days.
- ❑ 2001 EFF combined the cracker with Internet to crack DES in 1 day.
- ❑ Differential Cryptanalysis and Linear cryptanalysis can be used to crack DES
- ❑ NIST recommended 3DES


# 3DES

- ❑  $c = e_{k1}(d_{k2}(e_{k3}(m)))$
- ❑  $m = d_{k3}(e_{k2}(d_{k1}(c)))$
- ❑  $k1$  and  $k2$  should be independent but  $k3$  can be independent or  $k3=k1$
- ❑  $k3 = k1$  results in 112 bit strength

# CBC: Outside vs. Inside



# CBC: Outside vs. Inside (Cont)



# Key 3DES Design Decisions

1. 3 stages
2. Two keys
3. E-D-E
4. CBC Outside



# 1. Why not 2DES?

- ❑  $ek_1(ek_2(m))$
- ❑ 2DES is only twice as secure as DES (57-bit key)
- ❑ Suppose you know  $(m_1, c_1), (m_2, c_2), \dots$
- ❑  $c_1 = ek_1(ek_2(m_1))$
- ❑  $dk_1(c_1) = ek_2(m_1)$
- ❑  $k_1$  and  $k_2$  can be found by preparing two  $2^{56}$  entry tables
- ❑ Table 1 contains all possible encryptions of  $m_1$ .
- ❑ Table 2 contains all possible decryptions of  $c_1$ .
- ❑ Sort both tables.
- ❑ Find matching entries  $\Rightarrow$  potential  $(k_1, k_2)$  pairs
- ❑ Try these pairs on  $(m_2, c_2), \dots$

## 2. Why Only Two Keys?

- $k_3 = k_1$  is as secure as  $k_3 \neq k_1$
- Given  $(m, c)$  pairs, it is easy to find 3 keys such that  $e_{k_1}(d_{k_2}(e_{k_3}(m))) = r$
- But finding the keys when  $k_3 = k_1$  is difficult.

### 3. Why E-D-E and not E-E-E?

- ❑ E and D are both equally strong encryptions.
- ❑ With  $k_1=k_2$ ,  $EDE = E$   
 $\Rightarrow$  a 3DES system can talk to DES by setting  $k_1=k_2$

## 4. Why CBC outside?

### 1. Bit Flipping:

- CBC Outside: One bit flip in the cipher text causes that block of plain text and next block garbled  
⇒ Self-Synchronizing
- CBC Inside: One bit flip in the cipher text causes more blocks to be garbled.


### 2. Pipelining:

- More pipelining possible in CBC inside implementation.

### 3. Flexibility of Change:

- CBC outside: Can easily replace CBC with other feedback modes (ECB, CFB, ...)

# Summary



1. To encrypt long messages, we need to use different modes of operation
2. Five modes of operation: ECB, CBC, OFG, CFB, CTR
3. Privacy + Integrity: Use CRC or CBC residue
4. 3DES uses two keys and E-D-E sequence and CBC on the outside.

# References

1. C. Kaufman, R. Perlman, and M. Speciner, “Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World,” 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed, Prentice Hall, 2002, ISBN: 0130460192
2. William Stallings, “Cryptography and Network Security,” 4<sup>th</sup> Ed, Prentice-Hall, 2006, ISBN:013187316
3. A. W. Dent and C. J. Mitchell, “User’s Guide to Cryptography and Standards,” Artech House, 2005, ISBN:1580535305
4. N. Ferguson and B. Schneier, “Practical Cryptography,” Wiley, 2003, ISBN:047122894X

## Homework 6

- ❑ Read chapter 4 of the textbook
- ❑ Submit answer to Exercise 4.4
- ❑ **Exercise 4.4:** What is a practical method of finding a triple of keys that maps a *given* plain text to a given cipher text using EDE?

Hint: 1. You have only one (m, c) pair

2. Worst case is to have 3 nested loops for trying all  $k_1, k_2, k_3 \Rightarrow 2^{64} \times 2^{64} \times 2^{64} = 2^{192}$  steps but requires storing only 1 intermediate result.

3. How can you reduce the number of steps using more storage for intermediate results.