
# Intrusion<br/>Detection



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Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at:

http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/

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- 1. Intruders
- 2. Intrusion Detection
- 3. Password Management

These slides are based partly on Lawrie Brown's slides supplied with William Stallings's book "Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice," 5<sup>th</sup> Ed, 2011.

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# **Concepts**

- Intrusion: Break into, misuse, or exploit a system (against policy)
- Intruders: Insiders or outsiders

  Most IDS are designed for outsiders
- □ Vulnerability: Weakness that could be used by the attacker
- ☐ Threat: Party that exploits a vulnerability
- Structured Threat: Adversaries with a formal methodology, a financial sponsor, and a defined objective.
- Unstructured Threat: Compromise victims out of intellectual curiosity

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#### Intrusion vs. Extrusion Detection

- Intrusion Detection: Detecting unauthorized activity by inspecting inbound traffic
- Extrusion Detection: Detecting unauthorized activity by inspecting outbound traffic
- Extrusion: Insider visiting malicious web site or a Trojan contacting a remote internet relay chat channel

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# **Examples of Intrusion**

- Remote root compromise
- Web server defacement
- Guessing / cracking passwords
- Copying viewing sensitive data / databases
- Running a packet sniffer
- Distributing pirated software
- Using an unsecured modem to access net
- ☐ Impersonating a user to reset password
- Using an unattended workstation

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# **Categories of Intruders**

- □ Hackers: Motivated by thrill of access and status
  - > Hacking community a strong meritocracy
  - > Status is determined by level of competence
  - Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) -Collect / disseminate vulnerability info / responses
- Criminal Enterprises: Organized groups of hackers
  - > E.g., Eastern European or Russian hackers
  - > Often target credit cards on e-commerce server
- □ Internal Threat
  - > May be motivated by revenge / entitlement
  - > When employment terminated
  - > Taking customer data when move to competitor

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer\_emergency\_response\_team">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer\_emergency\_response\_team</a>
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# **Hacker Behavior Example**

- 1. Select target using IP lookup tools
- 2. Map network for accessible services
- 3. Identify potentially vulnerable services
- 4. Brute force (guess) passwords
- 5. Install remote administration tool
- 6. Wait for admin to log on and capture password
- 7. Use password to access remainder of network

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacker\_(computer\_security">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacker\_(computer\_security)</a>

# **Criminal Enterprise Behavior**

- 1. Act quickly and precisely to make their activities harder to detect
- 2. Exploit perimeter via vulnerable ports
- 3. Use trojan horses (hidden software) to leave back doors for re-entry
- 4. Use sniffers to capture passwords
- 5. Do not stick around until noticed
- 6. Make few or no mistakes.

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# **Insider Behavior Example**

- 1. Create network accounts for themselves and their friends
- 2. Access accounts and applications they wouldn't normally use for their daily jobs
- 3. E-mail former and prospective employers
- 4. Conduct furtive instant-messaging chats
- 5. Visit web sites that cater to disgruntled employees, such as f'dcompany.com
- 6. Perform large downloads and file copying
- 7. Access the network during off hours.

# **Intrusion Techniques**

- Often use system / software vulnerabilities
- Key goal often is to acquire passwords
  - > So then exercise access rights of owner
- Basic attack methodology
  - > Target acquisition and information gathering
  - > Initial access
  - > Privilege escalation
  - > Covering tracks

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# **Password Guessing and Capture**

- □ Attacker knows a login (from email/web page etc)
- ☐ Then attempts to guess password for it
  - > Defaults, short passwords, common word searches
  - User info (variations on names, birthday, phone, common words/interests)
  - > Exhaustively searching all possible passwords
- Check by login or against stolen password file
- Another attack involves password capture
  - > Watching over shoulder as password is entered
  - > Using a trojan horse program to collect
  - > Monitoring an insecure network login, E.g., FTP


Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password\_cracking">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password\_cracking</a>

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#### **Notification Alarms**

- □ False Positive: Valid traffic causes an alarm
- □ False Negative: Invalid traffic does not cause an alarm



# **Types of IDS**

- Signature Based IDS: Search for known attack patterns using pattern matching, heuristics, protocol decode
- Rule Based IDS: Violation of security policy
- Anomaly-Based IDS
- Statistical or non-statistical detection
- □ Response:
  - > Passive: Alert the console
  - Reactive: Stop the intrusion ⇒ Intrusion Prevention System
     ⇒ Blocking

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\_detection\_system">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\_detection\_system</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\_detection">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\_detection</a>

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## Sample Signatures

- □ ICMP Floods directed at a single host
- Connections of multiple ports using TCP SYN
- □ A single host sweeping a range of nodes using ICMP
- □ A single host sweeping a range of nodes using TCP
- □ Connections to multiple ports with RPC requests between two nodes

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# **Anomaly Based IDS**

- □ Traffic that deviates from normal, e.g., routing updates from a host
- □ Statistical Anomaly: sudden changes in traffic characteristics
- Machine Learning: Learn from false positives and negatives
- □ Data Mining: Develop fuzzy rules to detect attacks

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## **Statistical Anomaly Detection**

- Threshold detection
  - > Count occurrences of specific event over time
  - > If exceed reasonable value assume intrusion
  - > Used alone, it is a crude and ineffective detector
- Profile based
  - > Characterize past behavior of users
  - > Detect significant deviations from this
  - > Profile usually multi-parameter

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#### **Audit Records**

- □ Fundamental tool for intrusion detection
- Native audit records: Part of all common multi-user O/S
- Detection-specific audit records
  - > Created specifically to collect wanted info
- Audit Record Analysis: Foundation of statistical approaches
- Analyze records to get metrics over time
  - > Counter, gauge, interval timer, resource use
- Use various tests on these to determine if current behavior is acceptable
  - Mean & standard deviation, multivariate, markov process, time series, operational
- Key advantage is no prior knowledge used

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information\_security\_audit">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audit\_trail</a>
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#### **Rule-Based Intrusion Detection**

- Rule-based anomaly detection
  - > Analyze historical audit records to identify usage patterns and auto-generate rules for them
- Rule-based penetration identification
  - > Uses expert systems technology
  - > With rules identifying known penetration, weakness patterns, or suspicious behavior
  - > Compare audit records or states against rules
  - > Rules usually machine & O/S specific
  - > Rules are generated by experts who interview & codify knowledge of security admins
  - > Quality depends on how well this is done

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
# **Types of IDS**

- □ IDS Sensor: SW/HW to collect and analyze network traffic
- Host IDS: Runs on each server or host

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network intrusion detection system

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■ Network IDS: Monitors traffic on the network Network IDS may be part of routers or firewalls



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### Host vs. Network IDS

IDS Type	Pros	Cons
Host IDS	Verification of success or	OS/HW dependent
	failure of an attack pos-	
	sible	
	Specific to a system	Impacts performance of
		the host
	Not limited by network	One per host $\Rightarrow$ Expen-
	bandwidth or encryption	sive
Network	Protects all hosts	Challenging to see all
IDS		traffic in a switched en-
		vironment
	Independent of OS/HW	Too much traffic to ana-
	·	lyze
	Useful against probes	Not effective against sin-
	and DoS attacks	gle packet attacks and
		encrypted traffic

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# **Honeypots**

- Decoy systems to lure attackers
  - > Away from accessing critical systems
  - > To collect information of their activities
  - > To encourage attacker to stay on system so administrator can respond
- Are filled with fabricated information
- Instrumented to collect detailed information on attackers activities
- Single or multiple networked systems

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honeypot\_(computing)">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honeypot\_(computing)</a>

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# **Password Management**

- □ Front-line defense against intruders
- Users supply both:
  - > Login determines privileges of that user
  - > Password to identify them
- Passwords often stored encrypted
  - > Unix uses multiple DES (variant with salt)
  - > More recent systems use crypto hash function
- □ Should protect password file on system

Ref: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt\_(cryptography">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt\_(cryptography)</a>

## **Managing Passwords**

- Education:
  - > Give guidelines for good passwords
  - > Require a mix of upper & lower case letters, numbers, punctuation
- Computer Generated Passwords
  - > Not memorisable, so will be written down (sticky label syndrome)
  - > FIPS PUB 181: Random pronounceable syllables
- Reactive Checking: Run offline password guessing tools
- □ Proactive Checking: Check when users select passwords
  - > Compare against dictionary of bad passwords

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- 1. Intruders can be both internal, external or organized
- 2. IDS can be signature based, anomaly based, or statistical Should minimized false positives and false negatives.
- 3. IDS can be host based or network based. Host based is more scalable.
- 4. Honeypots can be used to detect intruders
- 5. Password management requires education and proactive checking

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