


Message Authentication Codes

Was this message altered?



Did he really send this?

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Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at:

<http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/>



1. Message Authentication
2. MACS based on Hash Functions: HMAC
3. MACs based on Block Ciphers: DAA and CMAC
4. Authenticated Encryption: CCM and GCM
5. Pseudorandom Number Generation Using Hash Functions and MACs


These slides are based partly on Lawrie Brown's slides supplied with William Stallings's book "Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice," 6th Ed, 2013.

Message Security Requirements


- ❑ Disclosure
- ❑ Traffic analysis
- ❑ Masquerade
- ❑ Content modification
- ❑ Sequence modification
- ❑ Timing modification
- ❑ Source repudiation
- ❑ Destination repudiation

Message Authentication = Integrity + Source Authentication

Public-Key Authentication and Secrecy



- ❑ Double public key encryption provides authentication and integrity. Double public key \Rightarrow Very compute intensive
- ❑ Crypto checksum (MAC) is better.
Based on a secret key and the message.
Can also encrypt with the same or different key.



MAC Properties

- ❑ A MAC is a cryptographic checksum

$$\text{MAC} = C_K(M)$$

- Condenses a variable-length message M using a secret key
 - To a fixed-sized authenticator
- ❑ Is a many-to-one function
 - Potentially many messages have same MAC
 - But finding these needs to be very difficult
 - ❑ Properties:
 1. It is infeasible to find another message with same MAC
 2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
 3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the message
 - ❑ Public key MACs provide non-repudiation.
Secret key MACs do not.

Security of MACs


- ❑ **Brute-force** attacks exploiting
 - Strong collision resistant hash have cost $\min(2^k, 2^n)$,
k=size of key, n=size of the hash
 - MACs with known message-MAC pairs
 - ❑ Can either attack keyspace (cf key search) or hash
 - ❑ 128-bit hash looks vulnerable, 160-bits better

HMAC Design Objectives

- ❑ Keyed Hash \Rightarrow includes a key along with message
- ❑ HMAC is a general design. Can use any hash function
 \Rightarrow HMAC-MD5, HMAC-AES
- ❑ Uses hash functions without modifications
- ❑ Allow for easy replace-ability of embedded hash function
- ❑ Preserve original performance of hash function without significant degradation
- ❑ Uses and handles keys in a simple way.
- ❑ Has well understood cryptographic analysis of authentication mechanism strength


HMAC

- ❑ RFC2104
- ❑ Uses hash function on the message:
$$\text{HMAC}_K(M) = \text{H}[(K^+ \oplus \text{opad}) \parallel \text{H}[(K^+ \oplus \text{ipad}) \parallel M]]$$
 - Where K^+ = key padded to b -bits or hashed to b -bits if $|k| > b$
 - b = block size for the hash
 - opad, ipad are constants
 - ipad = 36 repeated $b/8$ times
 - opad = 5C repeated $b/8$ times
- ❑ Any hash function can be used
 - E.g., MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool
- ❑ Proved that security of HMAC relates to that of the underlying hash algorithm




Using Symmetric Ciphers for MACs

- ❑ Can use any block cipher chaining mode and use final block as a MAC
- ❑ **Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) = DES-CBC**
 - Using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block
- ❑ For single block message X , $T = \text{MAC}(K, X)$
Weakness: T is also MAC of 2-block message $X || (X \oplus T)$




Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)

- ❑ Black and Rogaway fixed DAA problem by using 3 keys. Iwata updated by generating 3 keys from a single key.
- ❑ Adopted by NIST SP800-38B
- ❑ Two n-bit keys from a k-bit encryption key
- ❑ $L = E(K, 0^n)$
- ❑ $K_1 = L \cdot x$
- ❑ $K_2 = L \cdot x^2$
- ❑ $\cdot =$ Multiplication in $GF(2^n)$
- ❑ Using an irreducible polynomial with min 1's
 - $x^{64} + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ for 64 bits
 - $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$ for 128 bits



(a) Message length is integer multiple of block size





(b) Message length is not integer multiple of block size

Authenticated Encryption

- ❑ Confidentiality + Integrity:
 1. Hash-then-encrypt: $E(K, (M \parallel H(M)))$
 2. MAC-then-encrypt: $E(K_2, (M \parallel \text{MAC}(K_1, M)))$
Used in SSL/TLS
 3. Encrypt-then-MAC: $(C=E(K_2, M), T=\text{MAC}(K_1, C))$
Used in IPsec
 4. Encrypt-and-MAC: $(C=E(K_2, M), T=\text{MAC}(K_1, M))$
Used in SSH
- ❑ But security vulnerabilities with all these
- ❑ NIST fixed these vulnerabilities with CCM and GCM


CCM

- ❑ Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-MAC
- ❑ NIST SP 800-38C for WiFi
- ❑ Algorithmic ingredients
 - AES encryption algorithm
 - CTR mode of operation
 - CMAC authentication algorithm
- ❑ Single key for both encryption & MAC
- ❑ Counters are generated using a counter generation function
- ❑ 2 passes over plaintext: MAC+E
- ❑ Associate data = headers in clear




Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)

- ❑ NIST standard SP 800-38D, parallelizable
- ❑ Uses two functions:
 - GCTR - CTR mode with incremented counter
 - GHASH - a keyed hash function
- ❑ GHASH: plaintext xor'ed with feedback and *multiplied* with hash key H in $GF(2^{128})$ to generate authenticator tag $H=E[K,0^{128}]$
- ❑ Z_i 's are constructed from the encrypted text Y_i and associated data
- ❑ MAC-only mode also



(b) $GCTR_K(ICB, X_1 \parallel X_2 \parallel \dots \parallel X_n) = Y_n^*$




(a) $GHASH_H(X_1 \parallel X_2 \parallel \dots \parallel X_m) = \text{Tag}$

PRNG Using Hash and MACs

- ❑ Essential elements of Pseudo-Random Number generation:
 - Seed value
 - Deterministic algorithm
- ❑ Seed must be known only as needed
- ❑ PRNG can be based on
 1. Encryption algorithm
 2. Hash function (ISO18031 & NIST SP 800-90)
 3. MAC (NIST SP 800-90)

PRNG using a Hash Function


- ❑ SP800-90 and ISO18031
 - Take seed V
 - Repeatedly add 1
 - Hash V
 - Use n -bits of hash as random value
- ❑ Secure if good hash used




(a) PRNG using cryptographic hash function

PRNG using a MAC

- ❑ SP800-90, IEEE 802.11i, TLS
 - Use key
 - Input based on last hash in various ways



(b) PRNG using HMAC



Summary

1. Message authentication = Integrity + Source Authentication (with or without encryption)
2. Double public key encryption can be used but complex
⇒ Hash with a secret key
3. HMAC is a general procedure usable with any hash function
⇒ HMAC-MD5, HMAC-AES
4. Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) was found insecure
⇒ Fixed by CMAC using keys derived from a single key
5. Authenticated Encryption:
 1. CCM = CMAC + Counter mode
 2. GCM = Multiplication in $GF(2^{128})$ + Counter mode
6. Pseudorandom Number Generation (PRNG) using Hash Functions and MACs

Homework 12

12.6 There are four general approaches in authenticated encryption: HtE, MtE, EtM, and E&M.

- A. Which approach is used for CCM?
- B. Which approach is used for GCM?